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The purpose of this thesis is to determine the economic
impact of a proposed acquisition policy change. As an
interim measure, a class deviation to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation was issued 4 June 1987. The change
increases the small purchase noncompetitive threshold from
$1,000 to $2,500 for a test period of one year. This
deviation was issued after the research commenced but before
this report was issued. The primary reason for this change
is to reduce the administrative cost associated with
obtaining competition. Consequently, the government should
be prepared to make a trade-off between the administrative
cost of competing and any savings realized from competition.
Using the data collected from two field activities, NAS
Point Mugu and NWC China Lake, an analysis was conducted to
determine the costs and benefits associated with increasing
this threshold. This research will focus on administrative
order costs, shortage costs, procurement administrative lead
time, and productivity of acquisition personnel.
This thesis will conclude with observations about the
noncompetitive threshold and make recommendations concerning
a policy change.
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The Defense Procurement system, a myriad of rules and
regulations designed to further the interests of the
government, directs a corps of dedicated, professional,
individuals in managing the government acquisition process.
Within the Procurement system is the Simplified Procurement
Procedure which governs purchases not exceeding $25,000.
There exists a subset within the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (EAR) known as the Small Purchase Process that
governs purchases less than $1,000. The terminology of
Small Purchase Process and Simplified Procurement Procedures
will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. As
outlined in Part 13 of the Regulation, purchases not
exceeding $1,000 do not require competitive bids to
determine if the offered price is fair and reasonable.
Table 1.1 outlines the requirements for each class of small
purchase procurement.
Basically, the issue is, should this threshold be
increased to $2,500? In the opinion of personnel assigned
to the field contracting activities, the current threshold
of $1,000 appears to be thwarting efficiency, in that
seeking competition delays the procurement process. Any
savings achieved from obtaining competition does not offset
8
the cost incurred while waiting for the material or service
being procured. A more general issue is, how high should
this threshold be?
While conducting research for this thesis, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (P&L) issued a class deviation to the
FAR temporarily increasing the small purchase threshold from
$1,000 to $2,500. [Ref. 1]
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Small purchase procedures no
longer apply to the acquisition
of open market items. These
requirements must be procured
through formal contracting
procedures which include a
thirty day synopsis in the
Commerce Business Daily,
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The procurement environment we know today was created
forty years ago with the enactment of the Armed Service
Procurement Act of 1947. This Act established the initial
criteria to guide government procurement. Two years later,
in 1949, the Federal Property and Administrative Service Act
established regulations governing soliciting bids and making
awards for government contracts. It stated that all
procurements greater than $1,000 required formal advertising
unless they met one of seventeen specific exceptions. This
original $1,000 has been increased over forty years to its
present level of $25,000.
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations created the
small purchase and other simplified purchase procedures.
These procedures include the imprest fund, blanket purchase
agreements, delivery orders, and purchase orders. The
reason for these procedures is to reduce the administrative
costs associated with effecting a purchase and to provide an
opportunity for small businesses to receive a proportion of
government contracts. Consequently, the government should
be prepared to make a compromise between the administrative
costs of competing and any savings realized from
competition. This is not to say the government should pay a
high, exorbitant price to a vendor that is not qualified to
perform the required task. Rather, it must be recognized
that a trade-off between seeking competition and awarding to
the first vendor who responds to the solicitation will
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produce the lowest, net acquisition cost. Additionally,
prices less than the competitive threshold should be fair
and reasonable based on fair market prices in the
competitive market place.
When the simplified small purchase procedures were
created by the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, a
threshold of $250 was established as the minimum price for
obtaining competition. For a purchase exceeding $250 three
bids were required. That is, if a procurement was to be
below this amount, a government contracting officer did not
have to seek competition to demonstrate price
reasonableness. This threshold represented twenty-five
percent of the small purchase threshold of $1,000.
In August, 1958, Public Law 85-800 increased the small
purchase threshold to $2,500. However, the noncompetitive
limitation remained at $250. This represented only ten
percent of the small purchase threshold. In July, 1974,
under Public Law 93-356 the small purchase threshold was
increased to $10,000 and the competition requirement
increased to $500. However, this represents only five
percent of the small purchase threshold. In November, 1982,
under Public Law 97-86 these thresholds were increased to
$25,000 and $1,000 respectively. The current small purchase
threshold is $25,000 and there exists a temporary
noncompetitive threshold of $2,500 in effect for one year.
The $1,000 represents only four percent of the small
purchase threshold. As the small purchase threshold was
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increased through time, the threshold for competition has
not kept pace. It has decreased from twenty-five percent of
the small purchase threshold to ten percent, five percent,
and to four percent. The temporary threshold represents ten
percent of the current small purchase threshold. Figure
1.1 depicts the two relationships in 1947 and 1958. the
first year they were established and the first time a
threshold was increased.
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Figure 1.1 Small Purchase Threshold Vs.
Noncompetitive Threshold
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Figure 1.2 depicts the two thresholds from when they were
first established until the latest revision in 1982.
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Figure 1.2 Small Purchase Threshold Vs.
Noncopetitive Threshold
In June 1986, the Contracting Branch of the Naval
Weapons Center China Lake Supply Department submitted a
Model Installations Program Initiative (MIPI) to increase
the small purchase competition requirement from $1,000 to
$2,500. In July and September, both Commander, Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Command and Commander, Naval Supply
Systems Command indicated their favorable support for the
concept to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and
Logistics, (S&D). [Ref. 2; Ref. 3] In fact, the Naval
Supply Systems Command Strategic Plan of June 1985 proposes
similar policies in an attempt to enhance the procurement
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and customer service relationships. One of the Strategic
Plan objectives is to develop a plan of action and
milestones (POA&M) which would review short and long term
solutions to reduce acquisition lead times and procurement
backlogs. [Ref. 4]
In November 1986, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Logistics (A&D) issued a memorandum to the
Military Secretaries and Director Defense Logistics Agency
stating
:
. . . for those installations designated as model
installations, the Services are requested to test (for
calendar year 1987) raising the threshold in FAR 13.106
from $1,000 to $2,500 ....
However, China Lake was not designated to be a participant
in this experiment. [Ref. 5] Aside from this, also in
November, the Naval Supply Systems Command sponsored a
workshop designed to gather ideas from various government
and industrial procurement experts. Labeled the Defense
Contract Simplification Workshop, it endorsed the same
concept of increasing the threshold to $2,500. [Ref. 6]
This recommendation and fifty-three others were forwarded to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement on
15 January 1987.
On 12 January 1987, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(S&L) denied China Lake's request stating ". . . the request
would not lead to improved pricing through compe-
tition . . . ." [Ref. 7] One interpretation of his
statement might be he was looking at a decrease in
14
competition vice looking at the potential for an increase in
productivity. The intent of the initiative was to eliminate
time and cost consuming restrictions, namely obtaining three
competitive quotations and delaying the procurement process
in doing so.
On June 4, 1987, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(P&L) issued a class deviation to the FAR. It increased the
small purchase noncompetitive threshold from $1,000 to
$2,500 for a test period of one year.
C. OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to experimentally evaluate
the economic impact of increasing the small purchase
noncompetitive threshold from $1,000 to $2,500. The costs




What are the economic effects of raising the noncompeti-
tive small purchase threshold from $1,000 to $2,500?
Secondary research questions:
What are the incremental costs to the government re-
sulting from increasing the noncompetitive small purchase
threshold?
What are the material benefits to the government re-
sulting from increasing the noncompetitive threshold?
What effect would raising the threshold have on Procure-
ment Administrative Lead Time (PALT)?
15
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research data was collected through telephone and
personal interviews, literature search, and a review of
purchase files at Naval Weapons Center, China Lake and Naval
Air Station, Point Mugu. Interviews were conducted with
personnel at Naval Supply Systems Command, Naval
Postgraduate School, Naval Supply Center, San Diego, Naval
Regional Contracting Center, Long Beach, Naval Submarine
Base, Kings Bay, and other field level contracting
personnel
.
The literature review included Congressional
legislation, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Naval
Supply Acquisition Regulation Supplement ( SUPAR ) (NAVSUP
Publication 560), General Accounting Office reports,
newspaper articles. Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange reports. Naval Postgraduate School Masters Theses,
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake MIPI with supporting
documentation, and China Lake and Naval Air Station, Point
Mugu Purchasing Desk Guides.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This research is organized to give the reader an
overview of the Defense small purchase environment. Chapter
II provides a synopsis of what procurement personnel must do
in order to award a small purchase contract. Chapter III
provides the answers to the interview questions asked at NWC
China Lake and NAS Point Mugu. Chapter IV provides an
16
analysis of the data obtained from NWC China Lake and NAS
Point Mugu. Chapter V identifies the author's conclusions
and recommendations about the noncompetitive threshold and
what improvements might be realized.
G. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The thesis will present, analyze, and evaluate small
purchase procedures issued under the noncompetitive
threshold as outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation,
Chapter 13. In particular the impact of raising the limit
to $2,500 will be analyzed and conclusions and
recommendations drawn on this analysis will be made.
The research of purchase files was limited to two
activities. Naval Weapons Center, China Lake and Naval Air
Station, Point Mugu. China Lake was selected because of the
role it played in submitting the MIPI and Point Mugu was
selected because of its similarity in its mission with China
Lake; namely, Research & Development and Test & Evaluation.
It is assumed the reader is familiar with standard
Department of Defense acquisition concepts and terminology




Some of the small purchase procedures as they exist
today are not as simplified as one is led to believe. If
the anticipated unit price or purchase price is greater than
$1,000, the simplicity begins to disappear rather quickly as
the buyer must face numerous regulations and constraints.
What follows is a brief description of what a buyer must do
in these cases prior to awarding a contract.
A typical procurement will commence when the buyer
receives a requisition. The buyer will review the
requisition to ensure there are sufficient salient
characteristics so that he can make the purchase. At the
same time the buyer must also consider the type of
procurement instrument to utilize. Options include the
imprest fund, a blanket purchase agreement, a delivery
order, or a purchase order. A brief description of each
follows
.
The imprest fund is the simplest of all the procedures.
Essentially it is a petty cash fund with a normal purchase
limitation of $500. However, buyers are not usually
involved with the imprest fund because it is controlled by
the imprest fund cashier who is normally not a buyer. Also,
due to the low dollar threshold, the imprest fund falls
outside the scope of this thesis.
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This thesis will address the blanket purchase agreement,
the delivery order, and purchase order. The blanket
purchase agreement resembles the standard consumer charge
account. It is based on an agreement written with local
vendors who are utilized on a repetitive basis. The
contracting organization places oral calls against this
agreement. The vendor delivers the material and bills the
government on a monthly basis. This is a fairly simple
procedure and preempts the need for initiating written
purchase orders for every procurement action. As simple as
the procedures are, the blanket purchase agreement does not
release the buyer from the requirement to seek competition
for any procurement action greater than $1,000.
The delivery order is an order placed against a contract
awarded by a government agency like the General Services
Administration (GSA) or it is an order placed with another
governmental source like the Federal Prison Industries,
National Industries for the Blind, or National Industries
for the Severely Handicapped. Listings known as the Federal
Supply Schedules are promulgated by the General Services
Administration. These list those organizations that have
been awarded contracts for selective items. Some of these
contracts are mandatory schedules meaning the buyer must
place an order for the desired item with one of the listed
contractors who is able to meet the schedule requirements.
This reduces some of the buyers flexibility. However, if
the buyer is able to find a lower price in the open market,
19
the schedule may be dispensed with. Similarly if an urgent
requirement is placed, the schedules may also be waived in
order to fill the requirement. The contracting officer may
waive the schedule, but in doing so, he must document
reasons why.
Lastly is the purchase order of which the major research
for this paper was centered around. The Naval Supply
Systems Command Publication 560 in paragraph 13.501 defines
a purchase order
:
A purchase order is an offer by the government to buy
certain supplies and services in accordance with specified
terms and conditions contained in the order. A purchase
order is awarded as a result of a quotation ....
When issuing a purchase order, a buyer essentially starts
from the beginning. That is, he must seek out potential
vendors based on the commodity required and review the
vendor's prices. This procedure is very time consuming.
The buyer must review such things as the local classified
telephone listing, Thomas Register, industrial supply
catalogs, and industrial listings. Additionally, there is a
Procurement and Planning directory and various General
Services Administration catalogs and schedules to review.
If a purchasing agent has expertise in the commodity sought,
this search time is reduced.
If there are numerous individual items requested, no
local vendors available, or very detailed specifications or
drawings, then a written request for quotation (RFQ) should
be utilized. If a request for quotation is generated it is
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mailed to at least three vendors. The individual items are
listed with their descriptions. Vendors should be given
sufficient time to respond, taking into consideration the
customer's required delivery date. The vendor should be
given at least thirty calendar days to process the RFQ and
return it to the buying office.
An oral solicitation for the most part is quicker than
the written requests for vendor quotations as vendors often
respond to the buyers solicitation almost immediately. On
some occasions the vendor must take time to research the
material and reply at a later date. Some buys will require
ten to twelve telephone calls before three responsible bids
are received. [Ref. 8] On other occasions it will take a
few days for a vendor to respond and there is the chance a
buyer and vendor will miss each other, further delaying the
process
.
Once received, all quotes must be recorded on a bid
abstract sheet or small purchase worksheet where the quotes
are analyzed for price reasonableness. Obviously when more
items are requested, more time is required to analyze the
quotes. Another consideration concerning multi-item quotes
is when one vendor might submit a lower quote than another
for only a few items. If this difference is significant,
the evaluation is further complicated as the buyer must
undergo a more extensive review of the quotes. It is the
responsibility of the buyer to ensure that every purchase is
made at a fair and reasonable price and that the government
21
receives what it pays for in terms of quality and delivery.
[Ref. 9] Once a vendor is selected the buyer must document
the corresponding purchase files as to the reasons for
selection and prepare the purchase instrument for that
act ion
.
Listed below are some common pitfalls that buyers must
be aware of:
a. The buyer must ensure the vendor is a regular dealer
and technically competent to provide the service or
material
.
b. The buyer must be alert to possible collusion between
vendors and ensure vendors are not affiliated with nor
subsidiaries of each other.
c. The buyer must verify that one manufacturer is not
supplying two different dealers since they will base
their price on his price and insert their markup.
d. The buyer must ensure the requested item is not a
prohibited item nor requires special approval from
activities outside the command.
There are specific socio-economic issues that must be
adhered to as well. All small purchase requirements under
$25,000 must be awarded to a small business organization
unless it can be documented that to do so is not in the best
interest of the government. The Davis-Bacon Act, Service
Contract Act, and Buy American Act are other statutes that
also must be considered depending on the commodity or
service being procured and the value of the action.
Additionally, there are items to be purchased from specific
vendors and a list of material exempt from the Buy American
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Act. Table 2.1 is a listing of some of the more prominent
thresholds and the various restrictions that must be
considered by purchasing personnel.
TABLE 2.
1
SMALL PURCHASE PROCUREMENT THRESHOLDS
DOLLAR VALUE LIMITATION
500 maximum amount of an imprest fund
purchase
1,000 previous threshold requiring either
competition or a sole-source statement
if price is greater than $1,000.
Purchases less than $1,000 should be
equally distributed among local vendors.
2,000 Davis-Bacon Act (1931) applies. Purchase
orders in excess of $2,000 for construc-
tion require special clauses relating to
labor and minimum wages to construction
workers
.
2,500 Service Contract Act (1965) applies.
Services in excess of $2,500 require
special clauses with respect to minimum
wages, safety and health standards.
*** Assistant Secretary of Defense (P&L)
issued a class deviation to the FAR
establishing $2,500 as the limit dtd
4 Jun 87.
5,000 All purchases greater than $5,000 must
be reviewed by the Small & Disadvantaged
Business Utilization Specialist (SADBUS)
prior to solicitation if the purchase is
not going to be made to a small business.
10,000 Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (1936)
contractor selling supplies must be a
regular dealer of the supplies and must
pay minimum wages.
25,000 Limitation of small purchase threshold.
Any procurement greater than $25,000




The goal behind increasing the threshold and reducing
the competition requirement is to eliminate the resource
expenditures and forgone opportunity costs associated with
these time consuming steps in the transaction process. This
in turn will provide a quicker response to the customers'
requests and there will be a flow-down of other benefits as
well; i.e. quicker delivery and shorter resource down time.
(Resource down time considers the traditional equipment down
time but also allows for the personnel not being 100%
effectively utilized due to this inoperative equipment.)
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III. PRESENTATION OF DATA
On 15 and 18 June 1987, interviews were conducted with
personnel assigned to the Small Purchase Branch of the NWC
China Lake and NAS Point Mugu Purchasing divisions. The
basis for the interviews were to determine the present
workload and how it was influenced by the noncompetitive
threshold of $1,000 which was still in effect. Would
raising the threshold enhance the small purchase function or
would it be detrimental to the operation? Additionally,
completed purchase orders were reviewed for the purpose of
determining any delay in a procurement action due to the
requirement of soliciting three competitive bids. The
results of a questionnaire presented to both commands are
presented below.
1. How many contractual actions issued are less than
$1,000?
For the period Jan thru Mar 1987, NWC reported 3969
such actions. NAS reported 1560 for the period 1 Oct
86 - 31 May 87.
2. How many contractual actions issued are greater than
$1,000 but less than $2,500?
NWC reported 609 transactions for Jan - Mar 87 and
NAS reported 568 for the period 1 Oct 86-3 Jun 87.
3. What percent of contractual actions which were less
than $1,000 were competed? Would you expect the same
percent to be competed if the threshold is raised
to $2,500?
25
NWC responded that twelve percent were competed and
NAS reported ten percent. Both commands stated they
would expect the same percentage to be competed if the
threshold were raised.
4. What effect would raising the limit have on the buying
offices resources? Will it free resources?
Both commands replied they anticipated more purchases
would be made. To what extent resources have been
freed has not yet been determined.
5. How many personnel are dedicated to small purchase?
This answer should include buyers, supporting typists,
and other administrative personnel
.
NWC has sixty-three personnel assigned to the small
purchase function and NAS has twenty-seven personnel
ass igned
.
6. What are the paygrades of those personnel involved
with small purchasing? What is their longevity?
The average paygrade for both commands is a GS-5
with three years of service. Both activities have
a GS-11 supervisor assigned.
7. How much overtime is dedicated to purchases between
$1,000 and $2,500?
Neither command has their overtime segregated this
way and therefore could not respond to this question.
8. What is your small purchase procurement administrative
lead time?
Due to the way NWC is structured, they do not track
and therefore cannot report PALT. NAS did not track
PALT. However, it was estimated to be two weeks.
9. What effect would raising the limit have on PALT?
Would it increase/decrease? By how much?
Both commands indicated it would decrease but could
not determine by how much.
10. How many vendors are on your small purchase vendors
list? Would the number of vendors increase or
decrease?
NWC reported 17,150 vendors and NAS reported 15,000.
Neither command could state if their lists would
increase or decrease.
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11. What controls are in effect to ensure rotation of
vendors? If the threshold is increased, would these
controls be adequate as they currently exist?
Presently at NWC there are not any controls. They
are waiting for an ADP system (not APADE) to be
installed that will assist the buyers with this re-
quirement. At MAS each buyer has his or her own
tickler system they use to rotate the procurements.
It is the opinion of the researcher that presently
neither command utilizes a system that can ensure
procurements are adequately rotated among vendors.
12. What savings might accrue by raising the noncompeti-
tive threshold (reduction in personnel; reduction in
administrative support; reduction in storage costs;
reduction of backlog'?
NWC replied a reduction in backlog and administrative
support would occur as a result of an increased
.
reshold. NAS replied if they experienced any work-
load decreases they would direct the gained
toward the administrative functions.
i: If there is a backlog due to the competitive
threshold, does it place any program in jeopardy?
That is, will any program be cancelled due to the
lack of services or material that cannot be received
in timely manner?)
NWC replied a cancellation might not occur, but there
have been detrimental impacts. NAS also replied can-
cellation is not probable. NAS further stated the
priority could be increased or a sole source procure-
ment utilized if required.
14. How might the efficiency or effectiveness of the
buying process be improved by increasing the limit
from $1,000 to $2,500?
Both commands replied more buys would be made in less
time
.
15. What training have your small purchase buyers
received?
Both commands stated their buyers have attended the
DoD Small Purchase Course, various DoD training
courses, OJT, in-house training, and training on
selected issues.
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16. Are the buyers responsible/mature/experienced enough
to determine a fair and reasonable price at an
increased threshold?
Both commands stated their buyers were mature/
experienced enough to function responsibly at an
increased threshold.
17. Will you require a change in personnel - more
training, higher paygrades?
Both commands stated the less complex buys require
less experience. Therefore, a less senior/less
experienced buyer could perform these noncompetitive
procurements. Some additional training in the area




A sample of purchase orders was randomly selected from
manual logbooks and a computerized listing maintained by the
procurement clerks interviewed. The universe was defined to
be those purchase orders whose acquisition value was between
$1,000 and $2,500 and only one item was purchased. The
researcher reviewed these purchase orders to determine if
three competitive quotations were obtained; to determine the
monetary difference between quotations; and to determine how
long the procurement actions were delayed while the buyers
waited to receive these quotations. The sample was
constructed so as to disregard those awards issued under
mandatory GSA schedules, blanket purchase agreements, and
sole-source requirements as they tend to limit competition.
Each purchase order was reviewed for the following data:
1. date the requisition was received
2. date competition was solicited
3. dates bids were received
4. price quoted by the quotation
5. price of the purchase order
6. date the award was made
The following assumptions were made based on the data
reviewed
:
- The money saved as a result of competition was computed
accordingly
:
a) an average of the bids received was calculated
b) the value of the contract awarded was subtracted
from the average of the bids received
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c) the difference of (a-b) was deemed to be the
money saved as a result of obtaining competition
This process was selected because it incorporates all
quotations received. If no competition were required
for purchase orders less than $2,500, the buyer would
have an equal opportunity to select any one of the bids
Any quotation received greater than $2,500 was not
considered because it exceeded the dollar limitation
of the universe and the buyer would have to seek
competition even under the changed condition.
The number of days that elapsed be
quotations and vendor response is
seeking competition. The measured
the first solicitation was made as
of the request for quotation (RFQ)
last quotation was received as ind
stamp. This does not take into co
required to draft/prepare the RFQ
it. Although another source of de
tion time was not included in the
researcher was attempting to isola
from when the RFQ was issued until
responded. Generally, if an RFQ i
indication of a need for competiti
forewarn the customer to anticipat
receiving the material.
tween solicitation of
the delay due to
time span began when
indicated by the date
and ended when the
icated by a date-time
nsideration the time
prior to transmitting
lay, the RFQ prepara-
analysis because the
te only the time delay
the vendors
s used, it is a good
on. This should
e some delay in
- For oral solicitations, the period of time is measured
from when the buyer made his first telephone call and
it stopped the date the last telephone response was
received. In some cases this was only one day.
The following example is provided to demonstrate how the
data was evaluated:
Vendor A quotes $1,575 on 15 September
Vendor B quotes $1,489 on 19 September
Vendor C quotes $1,354 on 24 September
The average of the three quotations is $1,472.67.
The contract is awarded to vendor C on 26 September.
The computed savings is $1,473 - 1,354 = $119
The corresponding time delay is nine days; 24 - 15.
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Tables 4.1 and 4.2 depict the amount of money saved and the
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Based on ten purchases $146.80 were saved per
transaction.
Each transaction was delayed eighteen days.
* Even though there were no savings realized, these actions
are included because the purchase award was delayed due to
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TOTAL $1,329.23 TOTAL DAYS 121
Based on thirteen purchases $102.25 were saved per
transaction
.
Each transaction was delayed 9.3 days.
* Even though there were no savings realized, these actions
are included because the award was delayed due to the
requirement to seek competition.




In achieving these savings, certain costs must be
recognized. Some of these costs will be qualitative and
others will be quantitative.
1
. Qualitative
The qualitative costs include the day to day
slippage a project would incur because of competition. This
is a result of not having the required item and not being
able to continue production or experimentation. This delay
impacts not only the individual activities but also outside
32
commands. Both NAS Point Mugu and NWC China Lake are
research and development centers and play major roles in
weapons development and fleet support. Therefore, any
program slippage will have a detrimental impact on the
operating forces. The Pacific Missile Test Facility is
located at NAS Point Mugu and has a daily operating cost of
$500,000 per day [Ref. 10]. One of its major assets is the
open water range which is reserved many months in advance by
DOD and DOD contractors. Likewise, China Lake is the home
of the two largest, live firing, inland ranges in the free
world. Given the national importance of these commands,
their operating capability is extremely critical. Neither
field activity can afford any significant downtime as this
can lead to losing a project or suffering a setback.
Another qualitative area deserving consideration is
the stress procurement personnel encounter due to
frustration in dealing with vendors, administrative and
socio-economic requirements, and customer apprehension.
Operational availability is a third area that cannot
be distinctly evaluated. It will be enhanced by reducing
average customer wait time (ACWT). This is true not only
for these two R&D centers, but it also applies to the
general operating forces as well. An increase in the
noncompetitive threshold will reduce average customer wait
time and moreover enhance the combat effectiveness of these
units. This is especially true when units deploy without
material and this material is forwarded to the next port-of-
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call. There is an additional transportation expense
incurred as well as the risk of the unit experiencing
degraded mission capability.
2. Quantitative
DoD Instruction 4140.39 provides guidance in
quantifying the costs to be considered when determining a
procurement action cost. Primarily developed for the
Inventory Control Points, it provides a sound basis for
which to collect various data on administrative order costs,
holding costs, and shortage costs. The goal of any
inventory system is to minimize these three primary costs
while at the same time maximize the availability of the
demanded items.
Of the three costs, the holding costs will not be
examined in as great as detail as the administrative order
cost and the shortage cost. The holding cost is primarily
expressed as a monetary figure per period of time comprised
of the average inventory value and a hold cost rate. This
rate is expressed as a percentage consisting of factors such
as the time value of money invested in the inventory,
holding costs, obsolescence costs, and pilferage costs. The
Navy utilizes two rates to express the holding costs;
twenty-three percent for consumables and twenty-one percent
for repairables. [Ref. 11]
The purchase actions reviewed by the researcher were
single unit, one time, direct turnover procurements. That
is, the items were immediately delivered to the
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requisitioner and not placed into a stock system.
Therefore, holding costs for these particular items are
negl igible
.
In this section the researcher is going to derive
estimates of administrative order costs and shortage costs.
Within the simplified purchasing system, the included costs
should be those associated with the following work breakdown
structures
A. Solicitation effort
- purchase request review
- determine the method of procurement
- obtaining source list
- drafting and typing solicitation
- accomplishing solicitation
B. Evaluation and Award effort
- price/cost analysis
- selection of contractor
- draft and type contract
- purchase office review
- distribution of contract
C. Indirect Labor/Support costs not included in
A & B above
- communication costs
- internal reproduction equipment rental
- cost of printing contracts and solicitations
- cost of materials and supplies
- cost of mail
- automated data services
- support personnel
- facilities cost
In fiscal year 1985, following DODI 4140.39 guidelines,
NWC China Lake determined the total cost attributed to one
purchase order to be $126.71 [Ref. 12]. Of this, $46.23 is




Telephone charges $ 3.05
Utilities/maintenance $ 6.05
Purchase div. labor $18.56
If the competition threshold is increased there will be
an expected decrease in the costs associated with the work
breakdown structures previously mentioned because fewer
vendors will be solicited to obtain a quotation. Utilizing
the data obtained, if the noncompetitive threshold is
increased, a reduction in the following areas has been
determined: administrative order cost; and shortage cost.
There will be an increase in productivity which could
provide a further savings in procurement transaction costs
due to a reduction in manpower costs.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER COST
The administrative order cost is the cost attributed to
purchasing the material. It includes those costs to
generate the requirement, process the procurement, receive
and store the material, and all other procurement/receipt
related costs. Any changes associated with personnel
productivity and payroll will be addressed within this
expense element. The cost estimate provided by NWC China
Lake places the administrative order cost at $128 per
procurement traction, $46 of which is solely for processing
the purchase. By increasing the noncompetitive threshold to
$2,500 this cost will decrease by approximately 30% to $32
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[Ref. 8]. This is based on an immediate reduction in
associated ADP costs and telephone charges incurred while
soliciting quotations. Additional savings will be realized
due to the reduction of effort by the initiator and other
staff functions such as the sole-source determination board.
These two functions require about 2.5 man-hours and incur a
cost of $53. In fiscal year 1985, NWC reported forty
percent of the 51,000 requisitions received were sole-
source. If these two areas also experience a forty percent
in effort per transaction, then these costs will decrease by
$21 to $32. By raising the threshold to $2,500, there will
be no need for a sole-source determination for those
requisitions in the category $1,000 - $2,500. Likewise, the
cost of mail, supplies, and material will be decreased.
The administrative order cost has the potential to decrease
from $127 to $92.
1 . Productivity
By increasing the threshold there will be a thirty
percent increase in productivity by personnel in the
procurement branch [Ref. 8; Ref. 13]. This could lead to
personnel changes either as interdivis ional assignments or a
reduction in the work, force. Both commands indicated they
would assign personnel to other functions such as training,
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policy review, and customer service and vendor liaison
analysis of NWC China Lake is provided;
An
NWC reported 609 transactions in the category $1,000 -
$2,500 for the period 1 January 1987 thru 31 March 1987
Projecting this forward for the entire fiscal year,
there will be 2436 procurement transactions. There are
sixty personnel assigned to the small purchase branch of







260 man days per year
1750 manhours per year
6.7 manhours per day*
Based on a fiscal year 1986 total workload of 29,042
small purchase transactions, the average production
rate per buyer is 484 awards per year or 1.86 awards
per day. In the $1,000 - $2,500 category, the pro-
duction rate is .16 awards per day based on 2436
awards. The $1,000 - $2,500 purchases account for
ten percent of the buyer's time. If the time dedicated
to obtain competition for these purchases is reduced by
one-third and they represent ten percent of the buyer's
time, the net benefit is a three percent reduction of
personnel. These two people could be reassigned else-
where in the division or dismissed.
* 6.7 man-hours per day is recognized by manpower
personnel as the average productivity of an average
worker on a given day. However, payroll costs are
computed based on an eight hour day.
2 . Payroll
Due to the increase in productivity of the
procurement personnel there is the potential to reduce the
workforce. The payroll savings calculated below are based
on utilizing the mean for the data obtained from both
commands. A detailed computation is provided in Appendix A.
the typical buyer at both commands was identified as
a GS-5, step 3 with a 1987 average hourly wage rate
of $14.71. By reducing its staff by 1.5 people, each
command could realize an annual payroll savings of
$45,895.
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one of a buyer's functions is to report the status
of a customer's requisition. Assuming a ten percent
decrease in this activity, the yearly payroll savings
will be $1,275.
division supply clerks are tasked to directly interface
with the supply department to coordinate such things as
requisition status requests, technical information,
specifications and other related tasks. Assuming a ten
percent reduction of these functions, the annual
payroll savings will be $24,478.
department supervisors interviewed indicated thirty
percent of their time was dedicated to supply related
functions. This includes writing statement of work,
reviewing specifications, and coordinating delivery
schedules with program schedules. Reducing their
efforts by ten percent will yield a yearly payroll
savings of $35,227.
C. SHORTAGE COSTS
The shortage cost, lambda (A), is the cost associated
with not having the item when demanded. An actual cost is
very difficult to determine, so DODI 4140.39 permits an
implied cost to be utilized when determining inventory
requirements. If actual costs are available they may be
used. At the Inventory Control Points the Navy has assigned
values to the individual cogs for the specific items the ICP
manages. These shortage costs range from $50 to $6,000 and
are utilized when computing shortage cost parameters.
In this thesis, shortage costs are defined as resource
downtime. That is, the time an asset, personnel or
equipment, are not being fully utilized while awaiting for a
repair part or service. In the case of equipment, the cost
is the opportunity cost of the money invested in the asset
that is not being effectively utilized. Additionally, there
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is a loss associated with personnel. When the end user is
waiting for a part, he will not be 100% effective on that
particular project. This is not to say personnel are not
being productive, but there will be lost time on the current
task
.
1 . Procurement Administrative Lead Time
The shortage cost is attributed and directly
proportional to procurement administrative lead time.
Procurement administrative lead time (PALT) is the time
necessary to process the procurement action; measured in
calendar days from the date of receipt of a requisition by
the procurement activity to the day on which the award is
made [Ref. 14]. If the noncompetitive threshold is
increased, the time dedicated to obtaining competition will
decrease from approximately nine days at NWC China Lake, or
eighteen days at NAS Point Mugu, to three days at both
commands. This will significantly reduce the shortage costs
outlined in the previous section.
Delay due to seeking competition was calculated to
be 9.3 days and a corresponding monetary savings of $102.25
at NWC China Lake. In 1985 the mean NWC hourly rate for
personnel was $14.96. Projecting this forward using the
Department of Navy's escalation rates to 1987, the revised
rate is $15.87 [Ref. 15]. Based on an eight hour work day
the mean daily wage rate is $126.96. Assuming only one
worker affected, when extended over the 9.3 days delay
period, there exists the potential for lost wages for the
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project of $1180.73. The researcher recognizes for some
spare part requirements there will not be any impact on
productivity. However, in other situations the part may be
time-critical to the mission and severely impact the
productivity of more than one project engineer. In most
cases, the delay caused by the requirement to seek
competition will result, at a minimum, in a suboptimization
of personnel
.
Another interpretation of the shortage cost is by a
division supervisor. As managers of resource allocations,
they must compensate for any decrease in productivity.
Options include shifting resources or paying expediting
fees. Supervisors interviewed indicated they would increase
the award value by up to twenty percent depending on the
circumstances surrounding the project, in order to receive
the part ten days sooner. This in itself will offset any
savings generated at the $1,000 noncompetitive threshold.
D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The information below was generated by the data obtained
from NWC and NAS. The cumulative mean for;
Days Delay - 13 days
Money saved by competition - $122 per order
Annual purchase orders - 1786
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The interaction on administrative order cost and associated
payroll costs is presented below:
Money saved by competition ($122 * 1786) = $217,892
COST CAUSED BY COMPETITION
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
Admin order cost 62,510
Payroll
Buyers released 45,895
Buyers reduced workload 1,275
Division supervisors 35,227
Division supply coordinators 24,478
SHORTAGE COSTS
technicians $2,947,757
Total cost caused by competition $3,117,142
Less money saved by competition 217,892
CUMULATIVE COST OF COMPETITION $2,899,250
(See Appendix A for a detailed computation)
The 2.8 million dollars indicated above approaches an upper
bound representing the potential cost of obtaining
competition at the $1,000 noncompetitive small purchase
threshold. The researcher recognizes that for every
unfilled purchase order there may not be a lack of
productivity among the technicians. However, an unfilled
purchase order for services and repair parts will result in
a suboptimizat ion of command personnel. In practice a
manager will redirect the technician's efforts to another
project. If a technician loses as little as 1.6% of his
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productive time per purchase order awaiting parts, this will
offset any savings realized from obtaining competition at
the $1,000 threshold.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study was to analyze the economic
impacts resulting from increasing the small purchase
noncompetitive threshold from $1,000 to $2,500. The
principle conclusions and recommendations of this study are
presented below.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. An increase in the noncompetitive threshold from
$1,000 to $2,500 will reduce the administrative
ordering costs by thirty percent. This is a result of
a reduction in the costs associated with obtaining
competition in order to justify price reasonableness.
The savings are realized through reduced solicitation
costs, decreased requirements in cost and price
analysis, and a reduction of indirect labor and other
support costs.
2. An increase in the noncompetitive threshold will
improve the productivity of government procurement
personnel. More procurement actions will be awarded
during the same allotted manhours. The opportunity
to consolidate requirements under one purchase order
will also enhance the productivity of the procurement
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branch. Procurement managers may optimize the use
of their personnel by assigning them to other tasks
such as customer service and vendor liaison.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Permanently increase the noncompetitive threshold
to $2,500 as opposed to a one year test platform.
The low dollar concept of small purchasing places an
emphasis on productivity since it is quicker and less
complicated than formal contracting procedures. As a
result many small purchase transactions are completed
In fiscal year 1986, ninety percent of all Navy
procurement transactions were less than $25,000.
[Ref. 16]. Furthermore, greater than ninety-eight
percent of all DOD purchasing transactions were less
than $25,000 [Ref. 17]. Since procedures in small
purchasing are simplified, these purchases can be
completed by less experienced personnel. This will
enable senior personnel to be best utilized in other
functional areas such as training, policy review,
customer service, and vendor liaison. The researcher
recommends increasing the noncompetitive threshold
to $2,500 on a permanent basis.
2. The small purchase noncompetitive threshold should be
a rate that can be adjusted annually to reflect
current economic indices. One requirement could
place the rate at a fixed percentage of the small
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purchase dollar threshold, ie; ten percent, fifteen
percent, etc. The researcher recommends the Congress
enact legislation establishing the noncompetitive
threshold as a fixed ratio of the small purchase
threshold
.
3. The researcher recommends the GAO initiate a study for
the sole purpose of investigating the impact of
increasing the threshold to $15,000. This is based on
a survey conducted in the commercial sector by Dr.
Robert Williams and Dr. V. Sagar Bakhshi [Ref. 18].
Forty percent of the participants reported a compe-
titive threshold averaging $15,000. Enacting a
threshold similar to one such as this would place




DETAILED COMPUTATION OF SAVINGS
Administrative ordering cost: $35 x 1786 = $62,510





Possible reduction in workforce: $30,597 x 1.5 = $45,895
(GS - 5 avg annual salary) x (avg number of buyers reduced)
Reduction in buyer's workload: $30,597 x .041 = $1,275
(GS - 5 avg annual salary) x (expediting related tasks)
Reduction in end user supervisor
supply related functions $44,033 x .8 = $35,227
(GS - 12 avg supervisor salary) x (percentage of time)
eight supervisors experiencing a ten percent reduction of
time concerning supply functions
Reduction in end user division
supply focal point $30,597 x .8 = $24,478
(GS - 5 avg annual salary) x (percentage of time)
Shortage Cost of technicians:
13.65 x $15.87 x 8 x 1786 = $3,095,145
(avg days delay) x (avg hourly wage rate) x (hours per day)
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